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The primary function of a constitution, whether written or unwritten, is not to
constrain power but, in fact, to ‘constitute’ it. What does it mean for power to be
‘constituted’? What are the normative or practical implications of this ‘constitutional’
phenomenon?
The emergent dimensions of the coronavirus response in the EU — most
importantly, the extensive common borrowing contemplated by Next Generation
EU (NGEU), along with the effort to institute ‘rule-of-law conditionality’ to govern
distribution of its proceeds — should remind us all why these questions are
increasingly insistent in European integration.
The compromise negotiated by the German Presidency and agreed at the European
Council’s meeting of 10-11 December has been roundly criticized (e.g., here) for
subordinating the hopes for a robust rule-of-law conditionality to the imperatives
of NGEU. From our perspective, the result may put the EU on the path toward
a genuinely ‘constitutional’ transformation, one truly worthy of the name, rather
than persisting as a system that is unable to mobilize resources in amounts
commensurate with the challenges facing it. It is also vital, however, that the
proceeds be distributed in ways that uphold the Union’s core values of pluralist
democracy and the rule of law. This, in effect, was the question before the European
Council summit, and the German compromise — which is certainly not beyond
criticism — nonetheless moves the integration project in the right direction. The
veto threat by Hungary and Poland in the lead-up to the summit, as well as their
joint effort to water down the proposed rule-of-law conditionality (or at least defer
its application until the CJEU could rule), demonstrates quite clearly that they have
understood the genuinely ‘constitutional’ stakes.
The ‘constitution’ of power, in the most robust sense, entails mechanisms to
extract and redirect (‘mobilize’) human and fiscal resources in a legitimate and
compulsory fashion. Legitimate compulsory mobilization is the crucial element
in the political metabolism of a community, one that enables it to convert social
and economic resources into work for public ends. EU judges, lawyers, and legal
scholars have long been accustomed to using a conceptual vocabulary that casts
the integration project as if it were already constitutional. But the fragility of that
project over the last fifteen years — from the failure of the doomed (and mislabeled)
Constitutional Treaty, through the ‘polycrisis’ of the last decade (in the Eurozone, or
as to refugees, Brexit, and democratic backsliding in certain member states), and
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up to and including the insistent, more recent demands of climate change and the
coronavirus pandemic — have all raised considerable doubts about the aptness of
that ‘as if’-constitutional understanding of the EU.
The main problem with this dominant legal discourse is its dependence on
a category mistake. It confuses what we can call the ‘constraint function’ of
constitutionalism with the actual ‘constitution’ of power in the most robust sense. All
law constrains, and the mere fact that EU law has constrained the prerogatives of
its member states does not mean that EU law is itself constitutional, even as it aims
to ensure fundamental rights and the separation of powers. Rather, it is the member
states, in the exercise of their own constitutional authority, that have decided to
self-limit their powers for the sake of integration, and they have created a set of
technocratic and juristocratic ‘pre-commitment’ institutions at the EU level (notably
the Commission and CJEU, but also the ECB) to assist them in that task.
The category mistake of legal elites — this ‘as if’-constitutional outlook — has
arguably blinded many Europeans to perhaps the central contradiction of the
integration project, one that has particular salience in the context of crisis. On the
one hand, the member states have found themselves increasingly constrained
in the exercise of their own constitutional authority; but on the other, the EU has
been unable to fill the void — despite repeated crises — because it lacks genuine
‘metabolic’ constitutional authority in its own right.
As the two of us have recently written, despite the many challenges of the last
decade of crisis, the EU’s ‘metabolic’ constitution has remained almost entirely
national, and thus fundamentally fragmented among its member states. This is
best demonstrated by the traditionally small size of the EU budget (roughly only
1% of aggregated member-state GNI) as well as by the composition of the EU’s
purportedly ‘own resources’, 80% of which have been derived from member-
state contributions, with the remainder coming from custom duties and designated
taxes that are in fact collected nationally. In other words, there has never been a
significant autonomous resource-mobilization capacity at the EU level. Perhaps more
importantly, there has never been an EU tax collection service that ‘wears the EU
badge’, so to speak, operating on the basis of the EU’s own autonomous legitimacy
rather than that of the member states.
The EU’s ultimate dependence on the member states for fiscal mobilization is
understandable, given that the national level has long been the exclusive locus of
the sort of robust legitimacy needed to support this sort of ‘metabolic’ power. But the
question today is whether the coronavirus pandemic is prompting changes that may
lead to a more fundamental shift in the nature of EU governance.
The extensive common borrowing in NGEU, a sort of proto-fiscal mobilization
capacity — short of taxing power, to be sure, but still considerable — would seem to
point in that direction. Moreover, the combination of this borrowing capacity with the
imposition of a rule-of-law conditionality of some kind leads us to reconsider our prior
conclusion that the current situation falls short of the sort of ‘critical juncture’ needed
to force a fundamental transformation of the EU. Even as the actual ‘constitution’ of
power at the supranational level in the EU will remain an uphill struggle, there is an
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argument to be made that the foundations of a potentially constitutionalizing dynamic
are genuinely being laid.
The massive borrowing operation needed to finance NGEU (up to 750 billion euro)
— by far the most significant such operation in the history of the EU — will make
the Union one of the very largest bond issuers in the financial markets. The EU
‘will see its balance sheet transformed from occasional issuer to market stalwart’,
according to one commentator. This extensive borrowing, even if temporary, will
give the EU a capacity to mobilize fiscal resources on a scale that it has never
previously enjoyed. This program may well give rise, in effect, to the long sought
European ‘safe asset’ — a ‘Eurobond’ in all but name. These new bonds ‘could
boost integration between national financial systems, reduce the risk of runs on
national bond markets, and help detangle the “doom loop” of interdependence
among banks and local sovereigns’. Given the functional benefits this borrowing
offers, it will not be surprising to see significant pressure — despite resistance from
the usual quarters — to make similar operations a permanent feature of the EU fiscal
landscape. Indeed, authoritative voices in Europe — namely the ECB’s President
Christine Lagarde and the ESM Managing Director Klaus Regling — have already
advocated turning NGEU-type borrowing into a permanent instrument.
This capacity will, of course, still depend on the backing of taxes imposed and
collected at the national level, drawing on the member states’ more robust
democratic and constitutional legitimacy. In this regard NGEU certainly does not
involve any formal Europeanization of autonomous taxing authority. Nonetheless,
NGEU will create tangible incentives to ensure debt sustainability through greater
coordination of national tax legislation. And while this coordination will remain
under the rubric of the ‘own resources’ decision adopted under Article 311 TFEU
(requiring unanimity in the Council, mere consultation of the EP, and entry into force
only upon the approval of the member states according to domestic constitutional
requirements), the obvious functional advantages of common borrowing will be
conducive to facilitate, over time, a de facto fiscal mobilization capacity in the EU that
is much less fragmented among the member states than it is today.
With that capacity, moreover, could come a kind of polity-building power that reaches
well beyond the sort of technocratic and juristocratic ‘pre-commitment’ authority
that has underpinned European integration up to this point. That, at least, is the
potential effect of the draft regulation on rule-of-law conditionality, as well as the draft
Regulation on the Recovery and Resilience Facility and of their linkages to the future
MFF 2021-2027 and Own Resources Decision, the latter two requiring unanimity
for their adoption. The evident ‘constitutional’ resonance of these proposals — in
the ‘metabolic’ sense we are using the term here — explains why the Polish and
Hungarian governments have found this effort toward rule-of-law conditionality so
problematic. No doubt rule-of-law conditionality is not new — it was widely used in
the EU enlargement process and remains a tool in the distribution of structural funds.
What is new, however, is the genuinely ‘constitutional’ scale of the supranational
resource-mobilization that this new conditionality mechanism will support, vastly
increasing the EU’s collective leverage over the conduct of national governments.
In so doing, the combination of NGEU and the rule-of-law conditionality may help to
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create a new constitutional dynamic toward a new kind of post-pandemic EU, one
that will have the effect of defining the boundaries of full membership in a much more
robust sense than Article 2 TEU could ever achieve on its own.
There are considerable potential obstacles that could still inhibit or derail this
dynamic, to be sure. In the first instance, there are the obvious legal hurdles.
Hungary and Poland have pointed to a previously undisclosed opinion of the
Council Legal Service (CLS) in 2018 to argue that any effort to enforce rule-of-law
conditionality by way of a regulation adopted under Article 322(1)(a) TFEU would
violate Article 7 TEU as the sole means of such enforcement under the treaties.
Consequently, the two outlier member states argue that any such effort would in
fact require a treaty change. Commentators have harshly criticized the 2018 CLS
opinion, but the dispute recalls, as a legal matter, the very earliest of the so-called
‘constitutionalizing’ decisions of EU law in the 1960s. In Van Gend en Loos, the
Court of Justice was confronted by a seemingly exclusive enforcement mechanism
(the old Articles 169-170) but also had at its disposal a provision (the old Article 177)
whose language was sufficiently capacious, even if somewhat vague, to ground an
alternative enforcement mechanism. The Court opted for the latter precisely because
of the functional advantages that this alternative enforcement mechanism provided
to the cause of European integration. Will the Court opt for the same approach here?
It remains to be seen. But the CJEU will be under enormous pressure from the EU25
as well as the EP to do so.
In the end, however, this dispute will be less about law than about politics, even if
dressed up in the language of the law. Genuine constitutional change, as with any
fundamental process of institutional change, always entails the replacement of an old
‘rule of recognition’ with a new one, a process that can never be fully justified solely
by reference to the old ‘rule of recognition’. Politics — values — will always overtake
the law in the final moment of decision, even if dressed up in the language of the
old law. Nonetheless, the effort to retain the language of old law and to operate
within its forms is a key factor that typically differentiates legitimate and ultimately
successful and durable processes of constitutional change from ultimately transient
and ephemeral efforts. Hence the ingenuity of the current compromise on rule-of-
law conditionality in the adoption of NGEU, relying as it does on the adoption of
interpretative guidelines by the Commission (of admittedly questionable legal effect)
as well as the prospective of an eventual Court ruling.
If this gambit succeeds, the EU will have successfully tied the mobilization of fiscal
resources at a genuinely ‘constitutional’ scale to the enforcement of core values on
behalf of the polity as a whole. In doing so, it will take significant steps to transcend
the fragility of the ‘as if’ constitutionalism that has characterized the integration
project to date.
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